INTERNATIONAL POVERTY LAW:
a Response to Economic Globalization
Timothy K. Kuhner1
This paper addresses the relationship between economic globalization and the
theory and practice of poverty law in the United States. It suggests that poverty law must
be ‘internationalized’ in order to scrutinize poverty in today’s conditions.2 The degree to
which redistributionist and transformative social agendas are viable absent such
“internationalization” is the yardstick by which this need is to be measured. These
agendas to reduce inequality and facilitate empowerment of the poor have been
increasingly frustrated by some of the political and economic policies at the heart of
economic globalization. Ironically, other aspects of globalization offer great promise for
the realization of these agendas. Although this paper mainly addresses the challenges to
such agendas, the potential for a proactive use of globalization is addressed in conclusion.
Section One explains why the traditional domestic focus of poverty law theory and
practice must be expanded. Precise areas where this expansion is needed are suggested in
Section Two. By way of conclusion, Section Three proposes ways for poverty lawyers to
address the challenges outlined in the foregoing Sections.
Two preliminary matters must be emphasized at the outset. First, this paper
focuses primarily on particular aspects of economic globalization, not the other
components of globalization, such as those relating to science and technology, popular
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culture, or legal entitlements to human rights. For present purposes, economic
globalization is defined as the process by which free-market capitalism spreads across
nation-states and is incorporated into domestic socio-political structure.3 Second, much
of the relationship between globalization and poverty has been explored by scholars,
most of whom writing from within the fields of international development or political
science. Charting this relationship is by no means a new endeavor, nor is the idea of
reinventing poverty law in order to account for international processes. The general
contribution of this paper is to adapt and expand on that analysis for creating an area of
research and advocacy that can be termed “international poverty law.” Again, this is
distinct from revealing that certain subjects of poverty law are in fact international in
cause or effect, or analyzing those causes or effects from the standpoint of development
or political science disciplines. This paper is limited to exploring how this new discipline
might be exercised by poverty lawyers, and, in so doing, it adapts some existing analyses
and offers some original analyses as well. As such, this paper merely names and outlines
what will likely prove to be a long journey.
1. Rationales for International Poverty Law
Scholars have noted certain symptoms that justify a reinvention of poverty law.
First, a “globalization of both wealth and poverty” has occurred. 4 In so asserting,
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Professor Edgar Cahn specifies that our poor are increasingly pitted against their poor
because of the increased economic competition between nations.5 The globalization of
wealth and poverty, however, affects not only the poor. The middle and wealthy classes
have also become agitated, and, as a result, “[a]ny efforts undertaken by legal services
attorneys to redistribute wealth…are bound to meet with continued and increasing
political and judicial resistance.”6
Second, domestic issues have become international issues. Professor Lucy
Williams notes that “[l]abor and welfare law cannot be viewed as ‘domestic issues’
within any nation-state,” adding that individual states are not able to “control the impact
of capital flight and currency fluctuations” or successfully regulate immigration.7 Adding
to this, Professor Dani Rodrik signals the “significant increase in volatility in labormarket conditions” in the United States and an “increase in job insecurity.”8
Third, international issues have become domestic issues and produced domestic
changes. Economic globalization, itself an international issue of coordination among
countries, has produced prescriptions for domestic policy. Professor Kerry Rittich
suggests that principal among the results of these prescriptions are a widespread trend
among states of adopting “deregulated labor markets, open trade and capital accounts”
and “curtail[ing] or eliminat[ing] activities... which threaten to impede the proper
functioning of the global economy and economic growth.”9
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Each of these three types of symptoms of economic globalization implies that
poverty is now a international phenomenon—a product of the relationship between
nation-states. Poverty is affected and in some cases caused by global and regional
factors. This implication presupposes a new conceptualization of poverty, a task already
undertaken by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). The UNDP has
defined poverty in terms of the absence of the “choices and opportunities most basic to
human development—to lead a long, healthy, creative life and to enjoy a decent standard
of living, freedom, dignity, self-esteem and the respect of others.”10 It has situated the
availability of these choices and opportunities within the broader context of human
rights.11 The relevant human rights, in turn, are pursued by UNDP in three principal
ways: first, “establishing the right to development as one of the rights emanating from the
numerous multilateral human rights treaty regimes;”12 second, encouraging governments
to “work to enable individuals to realize full human dignity, including human rights—
economic, social, cultural, civil, and political;”13 and, third, fostering “good governance”
through “legislative, executive, and juridical reformation in all nations, at all levels […to]
foster individual participation in democracy nationally and locally.”14
Despite this growing recognition that poverty is a global issue, the focus of both
the research agenda and practice areas of poverty law has thus far been domestic. This is
problematic for two reasons: first, the international strategy of the UNDP, described
above, will fail without domestic support. The United Nations (UN) is composed of
10
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member states and has very limited power to affect domestic change; rather, the UN
serves as a forum in which the community of states generates solutions to cross -border
problems. Those solutions depend on the actions of individual states for implementation.
Consequently, the focus of U.S. poverty law must be broadened in order for international
collaboration to bear fruit.
The second reason is that, regardless of the UN’s agenda, the lack of attention
paid to the impact of international and transnational processes on domestic poverty
condemns poverty law to failure. A purely domestic focus reflects a de facto strategy of
attending to “proximate causes” of poverty while ignoring “but for causes.” Because of
this focus, poverty law is not directed at explaining how it can be possible in a democracy
to allow inner city schools to crumble while spending hundreds of billions of dollars to
invade and then rebuild a remote country.15 Perhaps that explanation would overlap with
the work of sociologists. However, poverty lawyers as advocates and participants, rather
than observers, could usefully expand their focus in this regard.
Poverty law does, of course, provide frameworks for handling the social needs of
the people attending those crumbling schools. This focus is essential, given the
widespread brutal need for immediate assistance.16 The power and emotional impact of
tangible suffering motivates efforts to manage and reduce such suffering. Those efforts
15
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attend to proximate causes and their immediate results, and can be characterized as
poverty management. However, an international focus does not detract from the
domestic focus. Management alone is insufficient if, as appears to be the case, the same
quantity of poverty, that same quota of human suffering, will be churned out next year by
the reigning social and political machinery. In light of this understanding, the traditional
domestic focus of poverty law must be expanded. Insofar as these transnational and
international factors are not incorporated into poverty law’s theory and practice, they will
have unmitigated effects.
2. Focus Areas of International Poverty Law
This Section contains a list and explanation of five areas of research and advocacy
that could constitute the beginning of an international poverty law agenda. Each of these
five areas is logically related to one or both of the latter two UNDP pursuits mentioned
earlier: the full realization of human dignity, including human rights, and good
governance.17 Human rights and good governance are, in turn, closely linked to two of
the primary strategies of poverty law: “securing a redistribution of goods, services, and
power on a more equitable basis,” and “expanding entitlements and creating new [legal]
remedies.”18 The first of these strategies depends on good governance. A properly
functioning executive and legislative branch should be responsive to the needs of its
constituents independent of their wealth and social status. The second of these strategies
depends on human rights. Such rights protect vulnerable individuals from exploitation at
the hands of powerful actors—including both government and private citizens. These

17
18

See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
Cahn, supra note 4, at 2135.

6

strategies are equally relevant to international poverty law. But, as is explained below,
they will have to adapt to new terrain created by economic globalization.

Destruction of community. The particular form taken by economic globalization is on
course to make all forms of human activity irrational unless that activity is efficient for
the purpose of wealth production. What is rational, of course, depends in part on the
value system of the actor. However, it also depends on the incentives inherent in
economic or other social structure. Market capitalism is of course not logically relevant
to ideology, but rather constitutes an economic system. Whether because of nature,
nurture, or independent truth, it is apparent that the economic and social spheres are interdependent. And in an environment of scarcity, many humans cannot afford to subjugate
the economic sphere to their social goals. Most importantly, for purposes of defining
poverty, the two spheres are intertwined.
In addition to a simple lack of money or “deprivation of the basic necessities of
life, …poverty is also isolation, lack of access to resources and support systems.”19
Resources denote not just economic capital, but family, community, and ultimately
psychic resources. The notion of a support system can quite literally be equated with a
biological ecosystem, the strength of which can be measured in accordance with the
health of its members and sustainability of their shared project—for the planet, for
themselves and for others, even those living in distinct ecosystems. This support system
is part of the nonmarket economy, which is damaged by economic globalization. Before
examining that relationship, consider the importance of the nonmarket economy:
Everywhere sectors of the market economy and the formal political system
are crying out for help from the nonmarket economy. Schools cannot educate
19
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without the help of parents. Delinquency, dropout rates, and illegitimacy
cannot be checked without help from home. Drugs cannot be curtailed without
parental involvement or peer support. Crime cannot be prevented without
neighborhood watch committees. Local government and the democratic
process itself rest on effective citizen participation. The elderly cannot be cared
for without help from family and spouse…Affordable, high-quality child care
cannot be achieved without the functional equivalent of extended family that
combines emotional nurture, developmental stimuli, and flexible hours. Good
health requires prevention, maintenance, nutrition, exercise, rest, and social
support.20

A relevant project for international poverty law would therefore be not just wealth
production by and for the poor, but also facilitating the preservation of the nonmarket
economy. This project requires that poverty lawyers engage with and modify the
economic globalization scheme as it takes root in the United States.
The market criterion of “efficiency for the purpose of wealth production” would
be perfectly acceptable if measured over geological time, and in accordance with a more
enlightened definition of wealth. In that sense, maybe the market ideology really is
perfect; the problem might lie with its shortsighted and greedy participants. Yet, the
market must be judged as it is implemented, and, as implemented, the motor of economic
globalization is the promotion of “growth as measured through increases in
macroeconomic indicators such as the gross domestic product.”21 To illustrate the
inadequacy of this measurement for the purpose of human welfare, consider that “every
time we put a grandmother in a nursing home, we record growth in the GDP[, while]
keeping a grandmother out of a nursing home…does not contribute to GDP.”22
The GDP represents the culmination of one particular social construction (in the
sociological sense) of work. This social construction contains delicate decisions as to
what types of human activity should be compensated. These decisions may be far less
20
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controversial, however, than the decision that only work that is compensated should be
considered in measuring the health of a country. It is unlikely that families should desire
to be compensated for caring for a relative in need. Indeed, the key issue is not where the
line has been drawn between productive work—encompassing “economic activity taking
place on the market”—and reproductive work—encompassing “such activities as child
and elder care, food preparation, volunteer work, and large amounts of education and
health care.”23 Rather, the key issue is whether the motor of economic globalization
should be the maximization of GDP, as opposed to human welfare. This project of
maximization dares human societies to see how inhuman they can become, and then
proceeds to reward the winner!
That some countries make the choice to prioritize GDP above all else would seem
to have little bearing on the choices of other countries. However, diversity among states
in this regard is not tenable in the international order, because the competition among
nation-states is winner take all.24 Economic power leads to political and military power,
which in turn leads to a decrease in restraints on how the national interest can be pursued.
On the domestic level, the existence of a judicial branch with binding enforcement
powers prevents this sort of “anarchy.” The judiciary can apply civil rights entitlements
to preclude unjust exploitation, bringing the power of the state to enforce its judgment.
No such system exists on the international level, or even within many corrupt, dictatorial,
or developing nations.
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The political incentive to measure growth in the narrowest of economic terms
relates to this reality of competition among countries. This complicates the substitution
of more holistic measures of wealth for GDP. Such projects are underway, nonetheless.
The Human Development Index (HDI)25 incorporates not only GDP, but other
measurements as well. Poverty law could productively focus on discovering the limits of
GDP and formulating and implementing alternative measurements of growth that would
make competition among nations a productive exercise, rather than a “race to the
bottom.”26

The evisceration of democratic politics. The project to reform the measurement of wealth
depends on the functioning of the democratic system. More broadly, the ability of the
poor, or any sector of the population, to effect change depends on the operation of
politics. Part of what makes economic globalization such a difficult subject for analysis
(and object of social change) is its impact on all areas of social life, including the
democratic system.
Globalization has defused politics in two ways: first, certain outcomes have been
conclusively deemed inappropriate, irrespective of democratic will, such as the provision
of social services. This so-called “golden straitjacket” arises from the market doctrine
that the private sector to be the source of growth, that the budget be balanced, that
inflation be eliminated, that tariffs and quotas be eliminated, and that domestic industries
and markets not be protected from foreign ownership or investment.27 The subsequent
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toll on democratic choice is two-part. At the outset, governments cannot afford to offer
extensive social services without infringing upon the newly-created domain of the private
sector. Additionally, the regulatory function is inhibited, since governments cannot pass
legislation mandating higher labor or environmental standards, unless the government
itself can absorb the cost of those standards. If corporations are forced to internalize the
externalities of their production (that is, to improve their environmental impact or
benefits to workers), they may choose to move to a less regulated country.28 These
dynamics explain why “[i]nternational economic integration is taking place against the
background of receding governments and diminished social obligations.”29
Second, the level of accountability of government to its citizens has decreased as
the nation-state itself has undergone a process of subjugation to largely unregulated
economic forces.30 The literature on the World Bank, International Monetary Fund,
Inter-American Development Bank, and World Trade Organization is beyond the scope
of this paper. For present purposes, it is sufficient to point out a commonality: each of
these institutions exists at a supranational level. Their processes of policy formation and
policy execution are not accountable to any one nation-state, or, by implication, to any
concrete electorate.

Systemic inequality. Although inequality can result from the preclusion of democratic
change, economic globalization has been linked to inequality in other ways. One of the
more readily apparent of these is that “reduced barriers to trade and investment
accentuate the asymmetry between groups that can cross international borders ... and
28
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those that cannot.”31 For example, highly skilled workers and many professionals are in a
superior position, vis-à-vis unskilled and semiskilled workers, to capitalize on open
markets. Although this constitutes a form of inequality, it is generated from a preexisting social ranking—professionals versus workers. Systemic inequality inherent in
and unique to the free-market economy is more difficult to isolate. It emanates from
entities whose existing is made possible only by the free-market economy: the
multinational corporation.
It is not contested that the goal and overall effect of this capitalist model of
globalization is wealth creation.32 The disputed question is “wealth creation for whom?”
Cahn observes that the problem is “not simply society’s lack of material abundance. This
society produces enough and has sufficient know-how and productive capacity to satisfy
the needs of every American. The issue is distribution.”33 This distributive question
lurks in the shadows of the sparkling creation of joint gains.
The distributive question is two-fold, encompassing, first, the domestic
distribution of benefits from globalization, and, second, the international distribution of
benefits as between nation-states. With regard to the former, workers may encounter
worsening standards and benefits, and decreased job security.34 However, this is not
necessarily a distributive issue, unless it can be shown that other social classes fair better,
and that they do so at the expense of workers. Cahn suggests that in the United States,
“[t]hose who contribute capital or labor are entitled to a return, although the lion’s share
31
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seems to go to those who contribute capital.”35 Certainly, U.S. labor representatives and
NAFTA protesters believe that a similar result obtains within the United States.36 The
distributive calculus appears to be similar in other countries, although potentially more
harsh in its implications. In Eastern Europe, Cahn claims that “market economics has
meant sinking into abject poverty while watching a handful of entrepreneurs reap
inconceivable wealth as the sole beneficiaries of free enterprise.”37
Regarding the latter distributive question, the international distribution of benefits
from globalization, traditional societies are, at best, at a disadvantage compared to
postindustrial societies in reaping gains from economic globalization. At worst, they are
affirmatively harmed by economic globalization. Professor Pippa Norris has presented
evidence that supports this latter proposition.
Traditional societies are facing increasing financial volatility and
economic insecurities produced by opening up markets to global forces,
illustrated by the East Asian financial crisis in 1997-99, throwing millions
into unemployment and slowing down investments in Latin America.
Since 1980, the majority of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, many in Latin
America, and most in transition have experienced disastrous failures in
growth, with setbacks in human security and growing poverty.38

The United States is widely considered to have gained the most from this inequality.
Both empirically and in common parlance, it is “[t]he country that has benefited most
from globalization, and [to have] the greatest stake in its success.”39
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An unequal distribution of benefits on both domestic and international fronts is
considered a cause of instability and social upheaval. Speth notes that “the world today is
deeply divided. It has become more polarized, both between countries and within
countries. The risk of an evolution toward an unstable, two-class world, with a huge
global underclass, is quite real.”40 Based on this international distributive calculus and its
projected, if not current, effects, poverty law could productively focus on advising U.S.
economic planners on tailoring their globalizing influence to ensure norms of basic
fairness to and equal participation of traditional societies. Since poverty lawyers are
concerned with the plight of the poor in relation to U.S. government, it is a small stretch
to expand that concern to the situation of poor nations in relation to the U.S. government.

Forced globalization, the military budget, and subsequent effects. The existence of
conflicts sufficient to warrant a use of force cannot be separated from the fact that some
states have far less to gain from globalization than others. A use of force by the United
States under current standards of practice requires one of several things: (1) authorization
from the United Nations Security Council, which itself requires that international peace
and security be threatened;41 (2) an armed attack by another state against U.S. territorial
integrity, justifying the use of defensive force;42 (3) indications that such an attack is
forthcoming, justifying the use of pre-emptive defensive force;43 or (4) a declaration by
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the executive, preferably endorsed by Congress, that another country constitutes an
unacceptable threat to U.S. interests, is therefore a “rogue state,” and consequently can be
attacked under a Just War theory.44 The first two types are unquestionably legal under
international law. The third is understandable, but illegal, and the fourth is
unquestionably illegal. It is difficult to imagine that a state that had both accepted the
tenants of economic globalization and prospered from them would ever constitute a
colorable threat to peace and security in the eyes of the UN, perpetrate an armed attack
against the United States, plan to perpetrate such an attack, or be deemed a rogue state by
the executive branch.
As noted above, globalization is not unconditionally positive for all countries at
all times. Rather, it has a “vast potential for further marginalizing already weak
nations.”45 Armed conflicts between the United States and other nations can partly be
contextualized in light of the comparative disadvantage of some nations in the scheme of
free-market capitalism and their subsequent resistance and hostility thereto. The task of
making economic globalization more inclusive, flexible, and equitable is therefore
synonymous with the task of eliminating inter-state conflict. Eliminating or even merely
decreasing the magnitude of such conflict would constitute a tremendous step towards
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enabling the federal government to focus its financial and intellectual resources on
eliminating the social problems within its own borders. Furthermore, poverty lawyers are
best able to observe how the poor within the United States are affected by international
conflict. As such, the task of making economic globalization more tenable for
disadvantaged states should not be delegated only to international development theorists.
For the domestic poverty law agenda, this task is worthwhile for many reasons, not least
of which avoiding the squandering of scarce federal resources in arms races, war, and
subsequent rebuilding of conquered states.
Armed conflicts between the United States and other nations can also be
contextualized in light of a lack of input by the poor in the United States into the reigning
model of economic globalization itself. Although it is true, as stated above, that
globalization has a “vast potential for further marginalizing already weak nations,”46 it is
also true that globalization has ‘vast potential for further marginalizing already weak
individuals’ within the United States.47 Each nation contains a variety of social classes
with potentially disparate interests. It is therefore a mistake to treat each nation as a
unitary actor asserting a set of homogenous interests. This mistake is more strategic than
substantive. It is not inaccurate to state that “we are heading into the twenty-first century
in a world consisting for the most part of a relatively small number of rich, satiated,
demographically stagnant societies and a large number of poverty-stricken, resourcedepleted nations,”48 nor is it inappropriate to ask “must it be the West against the rest?”49
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Strategically, however, the word “relatively” in the first quotation must be
emphasized. Although the U.S.’ poor have more “tangible capital”50 than other nations’
poor, they may be in a worse situation than other nations’ poor relative to the rich within
their own societies. The poor in the United States may have less as compared to the rich
in the United States, than do the poor in other nations as compared to the rich in other
nations.
The strategic implication of U.S. poverty is that economic globalization could be
meaningfully altered if the poor had a greater voice in its design and pursuit through
forceful means. Not only might the poor have opposed the invasion of Iraq if the choice
were understood as a tradeoff between war and Medicare,51 but the incidence of violent
confrontation between states might decline if economic globalization were a more
attractive plan for economically disadvantaged states. Poverty lawyers must recognize
that welfare programs compete with foreign policy imperatives for funding, and that the
nature of foreign policy depends, at its outset, on the amount of input by the poor into the
decisional processes that generate it.
The need for poverty law to incorporate foreign policy into its areas of research
and advocacy could not be clearer. Studies compiled by professors James Petras and
Morris Morley suggest a steadily increasing military expenditure by the United States:
Over the past three decades, U.S. military spending has been on an
accelerated upward spiral: during the Kennedy-Johnson years, it
averaged $59 billion (in current dollars) yearly; under Nixon and Ford,
…$82 billion; … Carter pushed it to $113 billion annually between
50
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of fiscal crisis” are “pleading for federal help” so as to avoid cutting Medicaid, a program that insures 50
million Americans. See Robin Toner and Robert Pear, “Cutbacks Imperil Health Coverage for States’
Poor,” N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2003, at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/28/politics/28HEAL.html.
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1977 and 1980; [during] the Reagan presidency, defense outlays
skyrocketed past $240 billion annually. …during the Bush presidency[,]
over the four-year period, total spending exceeded $1.2 trillion. The
greatest absolute increases occurred at a time when the world’s only
other superpower was disintegrating, thereby reinforcing Washington’s
capacity and will to intervene in any region of the globe where imperial
policy dictated.52

Currently, such spending has increased sharply, due both to factors outside direct U.S.
control—such as the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent necessity of
federal disaster relief funds—and factors within U.S. control—such as the creation of the
Department of Homeland Security, and invasion and ongoing efforts to reconstruct
Afghanistan and Iraq. The actions and commitments undertaken thus far by the second
Bush administration have totaled roughly $2 trillion for invasions and reconstructions.53
This is not to suggest that such funds would necessarily be destined for domestic
welfare programs if not dedicated to military spending and “humanitarian relief.”
Massive military spending does, however, make domestic welfare an even smaller
budgetary priority and distract from public attention on the same. The lack of public
attention then stifles the operation of democratic mechanisms for change.
Additionally, the investment in military operations and regime change cannot
always be traced to future pay-offs in peace and stability. Rather, it often contributes to
future debacles devastating for the poor, including the rise to power of such relevant
figures as Osama Bin Laden and Saddam Hussein.54 The activities sustained by the
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JAMES PETRAS AND MORRIS MORLEY, EMPIRE OR REPUBLIC? AMERICAN GLOBAL POWER AND DOMESTIC
DECAY 8-9 (1995).
53
See Gongloff and George, supra note 15.
54
Both Bin Laden and Hussein were close allies of the United States, receiving U.S. funds and operational
support, respectively, for operations against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and efforts to undermine Iran,
both in the 1970s and 1980s. See Michael Moran, “Bin Laden Comes Home to Roost,” MSNBC News,
available at http://stacks.msnbc.com/news/190144.asp?cp1=1#BODY (last visited Jul. 17, 2003) (“As his
unclassified CIA biography states, bin Laden left Saudi Arabia to fight the Soviet army in Afghanistan after
Moscow’s invasion in 1979. …What the CIA bio conveniently fails to specify (in its unclassified form, at
least) is that the MAK was nurtured by Pakistan’s state security services, the Inter-Services Intelligence

18

military budget appear not only to generate future debacles that occasion the need for
future spending, but to generate or perpetuate threats to national security that, in turn,
result in the repealing of civil and human rights. As U.S. civil rights, as set out in the
Constitution, are largely identical to the human rights the U.S. is bound to uphold per
treaty,55 the use of the phrase “civil rights” is meant to include “human rights.”

agency, or ISI, the CIA’s primary conduit for conducting the covert war against Moscow’s occupation…
So bin Laden, along with a small group of Islamic militants from Egypt, Pakistan, Lebanon, Syria and
Palestinian refugee camps all over the Middle East, became the “reliable” partners of the CIA in its war
against Moscow.”); The George Washington University, “U.S. Documents Show Embrace of Saddam
Hussein in Early 1980s Despite Chemical Weapons, External Agression, Human Rights Abuses,” NAT’L
SECURITY ARCHIVE, at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/press.htm (last visited Jul.
17, 2003); CNN.com, “Regime Change: From Building Ties with Saddam to Removing him From Power,”
available at http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/09/30/sproject.irq.regime.change/ (last visited Jul. 17, 2003)
(“Twenty years ago, the U.S. government was building ties to Saddam Hussein's government -- not trying
to overthrow it… To the United States, Iraq's secular regime was an important counter-balance to Iran,
where anti-American passion mixed with radical Islam had led to the overthrow of the U.S.-backed
Shah…The relationship with Iraq was severely tested after Saddam used chemical weapons against Iranian
forces and even gassed rebellious Kurds in the northern part of the country. [Also,] Iraq had begun a secret
program of its own: nuclear weapons. In 1981, Israel bombed and destroyed a nuclear reactor near Baghdad
believed to be the foundation of the weapons program…Iraq went on a multi-billion dollar buying binge,
purchasing components for building a nuclear bomb from Western companies eager for cash… It wasn't
until Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, that the United States turned against Saddam. Iraq was now
seen as big a danger to U.S. interests as Iran. ‘Now the same fear was being projected on Iraq -- that he
was an alarming, threatening leader in the region who was out to grab the oil weapon and use it against the
West…’”)
55
Compare the following human rights treaties with the rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. The
United States has ratified the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. res. 39/46, [annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc.
A/39/51 (1984)], entered into force June 26, 1987, at
http://heiwww.unige.ch/humanrts/instree/h2catoc.htm, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999
U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976,
at http://heiwww.unige.ch/humanrts/instree/b3ccpr.htm, and the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, entered into force Jan. 4, 1969, at
http://heiwww.unige.ch/humanrts/instree/d1cerd.htm. It has signed, but not ratified, the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, G.A. res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
46) at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, entered into force Sept. 3, 1981, at
http://heiwww.unige.ch/humanrts/instree/e1cedaw.htm, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A.
res. 44/25, annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), entered into force
Sept.2 1990, at http://heiwww.unige.ch/humanrts/instree/k2crc.htm, and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N.GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force Jan. 3, 1976, at
http://heiwww.unige.ch/humanrts/instree/b2esc.htm.
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The Repealing of rights. The poor are the most likely to be on the receiving end of civil
rights infringements: they are less visible, have fewer funds to dedicate to their legal
defense, are more likely to have partial or no citizenship, are more likely to be racial,
ethnic, religious, or political minorities, and exert less pressure on political decisionmakers.
National security and civil rights form a sort of dialectic, in that they are often
perceived as directly conflicting and an increase in pressure from one may serve to erode
the other. There has been a partial repealing of habeas corpus, open trials, the right to
counsel, the attorney–client privilege, equal protection, and privacy rights post September
11th.56 This result of the “terrorist threat” is predictable from past experience. Over fifty
years ago, Dr. O. John Rogge, detailing the ‘vanishment of our civil liberties,’ noted the
incremental nature of danger to such rights and the contexts in which such danger
manifests: “Insidiously, step by step, the enemies of our civil liberties have advanced
behind the poisonous smoke–screen of the ‘Communist threat’.”57 As if to prove
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See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (4th Cir 2003), No. 02-7338 (Jan. 8, 2003). See generally Human Rights Watch,
“Presumption of Guilt: Human Rights Abuses of Post–September 11 Detainees,” available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/us911/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2003); America Civil Liberties Union, “A
Second Federal Court Rejects Government Secrecy, Orders Open Immigration Hearings in Post–Sept. 11
Challenge,” May 29, 2002 available at
http://www.aclu.org/ImmigrantsRights/ImmigrantsRights.cfm?ID=10413&c=22 (last visited Apr. 6, 2003);
American Civil Liberties Union, "ACLU Calls Immigrant Registration Program Pretext for Mass
Detentions," December 19, 2002, available at
http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=11503&c=206; Dianne Donovan, "Let's Take
Away Your Freedom," Chicago Tribune, November 27, 2001, available at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/wtc/liberties/1127freedom.htm; Charles Lane, "Has Bush Infringed the
Constitution? The Debate Heats Up," Washington Post, September 3, 2002, available at
http://foi.missouri.edu/terrorandcivillib/hasbushinfringed.html. Writing in 1951, Dean Alison Reppy of
New York Law School, prophesized that “if the grist of the mill in the field of civil rights covering the
contemporary scene is any criterion of the future, we may be certain that the immediate succeeding years,
clouded as they are by the overtones of world conflict, will each produce for discussion their share of new
problems involving the maintenance and the advancement of our civil liberties.” See ALISON REPPY, CIVIL
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 266 (1951).
57
O. JOHN ROGGE, OUR VANISHING CIVIL LIBERTIES, 275 (1949). Dr. Rogge served as Assistant General
Counsel to the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Assistant United States Attorney General in
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Rogge’s premise, Attorney General John Ashcroft declared last week that illegal aliens
can be detained indefinitely, even if they have no known links to terrorist groups.58
It bears mentioning that the ‘war on terror’ did not begin with a declaration of war
by Congress, nor is it likely to conclude in the signing of a treaty between the United
States on one side of the table and all terrorists, present and future, on the other. Rather,
much like the ‘war on drugs,’ this war could be a long-standing feature of life in the
United States. Given its potential for long duration and the extreme vulnerability of the
poor to the decrease in civil liberties accompanying the war on terror, international
poverty law must make the war on terror and repealing of civil rights an area of research
and advocacy.

3. Specific Actions for International Poverty Lawyers
The previous Section described possible components of a poverty law research
and advocacy agenda. This Section offers ideas about how those components could be
addressed, and leads up to a conclusion on the overall project of international poverty
law. The premise underlying each of these ideas is that poverty law should make use of
the opportunities generated by globalization, as it goes about the task of exposing and
correcting its negative consequences for the poor.
First, a comparative analysis of poverty and solutions to poverty can be employed.
Asking, for example, how other countries handle immigration or balance the tension
between national security and human rights could generate insight for the resolution of
domestic problems. Justice Stevens of the U.S. Supreme Court recently did just this
charge of the Criminal Division before taking on the sedition case, investigating the spread of fascism and
the monopoly-cartel system. See id. at 14-23.
58
Rachel L. Swarns, “Illegal Aliens Can be Held Indefinitely, Ashcroft Says,” N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2003,
at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/26/international/worldspecial/26IMMI.html.
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considering how to define the “evolving standards of decency,” which, in turn, aid in the
definition of cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.59
Broadly speaking, cross-pollination of social and legal insight could enable economic
globalization to be more positive for all social strata. Globalization is neutral—its
content depends on those who engage it.
Second, international poverty lawyers should engage in the ‘international
regulatory agenda’60 and should do so in partnership with CEOs and military generals. It
should not be assumed that CEOs, military generals, or rich nations desire to
disadvantage the poor. They may even desire to help and believe in what they are doing.
These powerful actors, like anybody else, can be caught in difficult situations, such as
collective action problems. Absent regulation of economic globalization—to mandate
compliance, for example, with labor or environmental standards—individual companies
seeking to ‘do the right thing’ alone may be placed at a disadvantage from the increased
production costs. Their competitors could, by merely holding out a month or two before
following suit, achieve comparatively lower pricing and edge out their socially conscious
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See Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S.Ct. 2242 (2002), n. 21 (In deciding that the execution of the mentally
retarded violates the Eighth Amendment, the Court felt it relevant to state that “within the world
community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is
overwhelmingly disapproved.”) The Supreme Court recently employed another comparative law analysis,
this time in striking down a law prohibiting homosexual sodomy. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at __
(2003) (“To the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a wider civilization, it should be noted that
the reasoning and holding in Bowers have been rejected elsewhere. The European Court of Human Rights
has followed not Bowers, but its own decision in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom. Other nations, too, have
taken action consistent with an affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in
intimate, consensual conduct… The doctrine of stare decisis is essential to the respect accorded to the
judgments of the Court and to the stability of the law. It is not, however, an inexorable command.”) See
also EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 1396 (2002) (“On a
higher level of policy analysis, though, it may be useful to consider how foreign jurisdictions have resolved
‘roughly comparable questions,’” citing Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 993, 997 (1999) (Bryer, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari)).
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For an introduction to international administrative law, see Eleanor D. Kinney, The Emerging Field of
International Administrative Law: Its Content and Potential, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 415 (2002).
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competitors. This reasoning assumes consumer ignorance or apathy regarding the social
and environmental practices of corporations.61
Finally, for purposes of empowering the poor to understand the factors affecting
their lives, the “sociological imagination” should be emphasized and employed by
poverty lawyers. Forty-four years ago, Professor C. Wright Mills wrote about a problem
of disempowerment that has likely increased since then:
Nowadays men often feel that their private lives are a series of traps. They
sense that within their everyday worlds, they cannot overcome their troubles,
and in this feeling, they are often quite correct: What ordinary men are directly
aware of and what they try to do are bounded by the private orbits in which they
live; their visions and their powers are limited to the close-up scenes of job,
family, neighborhood… And the more aware they become, however vaguely, of
ambitions and threats which transcend their immediate locales, the more trapped
they seem to feel. Underlying this sense of being trapped are seemingly impersonal
changes in the very structure of continent-wide societies.62

One particular subset of these seemingly impersonal changes has been the subject of this
paper. Mills’ resolution to this problem hinged on recognizing the connection between
such grand changes and people’s every-day lives. With this recognition comes the
potential for action. If poverty lawyers can help chart, communicate, and affect these
connections, the poor will have powerful advocates indeed.
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Consider, for example, the market dominance of Wall Mart. Such dominance is, of course, maintained
by patronage.
62
C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION 1 (40th Anniversary ed., 2000).
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